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Hospital Immunity
Ellis B. Brannon*
A N AsicHAic RULE has been modified in Ohio by the Supreme
Court decision in Avellone v. St. John's Hospital.' How-
ever, this decision leaves open the question of whether the Ohio
Supreme Court will apply the New York Rule to hospital liability
in Ohio, or whether it will apply a less restrictive rule of liability
to hospitals in this State. Essentially, the question is whether
the hospital will be held responsible for all acts of negligence of
its agents occurring within the physical confines of hospital prem-
ises, or whether it will be excluded from liability in those in-
stances where the act of negligence was committed by a physi-
cian or an agent of the physician on the ground that such physi-
cian-practitioner is an independent contractor.
The first enunciation of hospital immunity by Ohio courts
was that of strict and total immunity. In Taylor v. Protestant
Hospital,2 the rule was challenged for the first time in this State.
The second branch of the syllabus in that decision stated the
rule:
"A public charitable hospital organized as such and open to
all persons although conducted under private management
is not liable for injuries to a patient of the hospital resulting
from the negligence of a nurse employed by it."
Thus, the Ohio Supreme Court established hospital immu-
nity. The court stated, in essence, that a hospital was peculiar
compared to other types of businesses, and because no profit was
expected, that hospitals were "masters different from others."
The doctrine of respondeat superior was not applied to the chari-
table institution, because the hospital was supposed not to have
the power to control the acts of its servants.
A second case of immunity was decided in 1922, in Taylor
v. Flower Deaconess Home and Hospital.3 For the first time,
* Member of the firm of Brannon and Renswick, of Cleveland, Ohio. For-
mal education University of Akron and University of Arizona Law School.
Of plaintiff's counsel in Avellone v. St. John's Hospital. [Editor's Note: An
article on this same subject appeared in the previous issue of this Law
Review, written by the defense counsel in the Avellone case.]
1 Aveilone v. St. John's Hospital, 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N. V. 2d 410 (1956);
discussed in, Jacobson, Hospital Tort Liability, 5 Clev.-Mar. L. R. 118 (1956)
and in, Morris, Sequelae of Recent Hospital Tort Liability, 6 Clev.-Mar.
L. R. 47 (1957).
2 Taylor v. Protestant Hospital, 85 Ohio St. 90, 96 N. E. 1089 (1911).
a Taylor v. Flower Deaconess Home and Hospital, 104 Ohio St. 61, 135 N. E.
287 (1922).
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then, the immunity rule was breached. The Supreme Court held
that the hospital would be liable for improper selection or reten-
tion of its employee, where the employee was incompetent to
perform his duties.
In 1930, a third case made the hospital liable for negligence
to those individuals who were not patients in the hospital nor
beneficiaries of its charity, but who were strangers to the hos-
pital. In Sisters of Charity v. Durelius,4 the court held, in para-
graph two of the syllabus:
"Charitable institutions, public and private, are on the same
basis as other corporations and individuals as to the liability
for negligence to those who are not beneficiaries of the
charity."
Then followed a series of cases in which immunity was main-
tained in favor of a hospital or other charitable institution.5
Preceding the Avellone decision, supra, the Ohio Supreme
Court reaffirmed, in Cullen v. Schmit,0 that a charitable institu-
tion is liable:
"1. When the injured person is not a beneficiary of the in-
stitution, and
2. When a beneficiary suffers harm as a result of the failure
on the part of the authorities of the institution to exer-
cise due care in the selection or retention of an employee."
(Emphasis supplied.)
The immunity rule as applied to paying patients was changed
as a result of the Avellone v. St. John's Hospital decision. 7 The
syllabus of that decision is as follows:
"(1) A corporation not for profit, which has as its purpose
the maintenance and operation of a hospital, is, under the
doctrine of respondeat superior, liable for the torts of its
servants. (Taylor, Admr. v. Protestant Hospital Assn., 85
Ohio St., 90, Rudy v. Lakeside Hospital, 115 Ohio St. 539,
and paragraphs one and two of the syllabus of Lakeside
Hospital v. Kovar, Admr., 131 Ohio St. 333, overruled).
"(2) In an action to recover damages for injury to a pa-
tient alleged to have been caused by the negligence of a non-
profit hospital, an answer filed by the defendant, which al-
leges that it is a corporation not for profit maintaining and
operating a public charitable hospital, does not state a de-
fense and is subject to demurrer."
4 Sisters of Charity v. Durelius, 123 Ohio St. 52, 173 N. E. 737 (1930).
5 Lakeside Hospital v. Kovar, 131 Ohio St. 333, 2 N. E. 2d 857 (1936); Wad-
dell v. Y. W. C. A., 133 Ohio St. 601, 15 N. E. 2d 140 (1938).
6 Cullen v. Schmidt, 139 Ohio St. 194, 39 N. E. 2d 148 (1942).
7 Supra, n. 1.
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The first branch of the syllabus of the Avellone case decided
only the right of a paying patient to maintain a suit against the
hospital, where formerly that right did not exist. The language
of the court which amplifies the first branch of the syllabus is as
follows:
"(165 0. S. 477-478 (1956))
"We, thus, conclude that a corporation not for profit, which
has as its purpose the maintenance and operation of a hos-
pital, is, under the doctrine respondeat superior (and the
various rules and exceptions applicable thereto), liable for
the torts of its servants, and leave for future determination
the application of this doctrine to the facts of the instant
case as may be proved on trial. For instance, we are not
deciding that persons working in a hospital, such as doctors
and nurses, under circumstances where the hospital has no
authority or right of control over them, can bind the hospital
by their negligent actions. See Schloendorff vs. Society of
New York Hospital, 211 N. Y., 125, 105 N. E. 92, 52 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 505."
It was urged, at the time of argument before the Supreme
Court, that the New York Rule should be adopted in Ohio, since
the New York Rule was the only tested and developed rule avail-
able to the parties at that time. The New York Rule is stated as
follows: 8
A hospital is held liable for those "administrative" acts
wherein the employees of the hospital negligently perform
routine administrative duties, but the "professional" acts in-
volving surgery or treatment of a patient do not impose
liability upon the hospital.
It was also urged during argument that the New York Rule
had "severe limitations of its own," for it leads to, rather than
away from, litigation. It was further stated that, under this rule,
"the parties never know whether a particular act of a nurse will
be deemed a 'professional' act granting immunity to the hospital
or be held to be an 'administrative' act invoking respondeat
superior against the hospital until it is litigated and so deter-
mined on its own facts." 9
The question obviously is this: If the New York Rule, which
distinguishes between "administrative" and "professional" acts,
is unsatisfactory, would it not be logical to hold a hospital re-
sponsible for all acts of negligence occurring on its premises,
8 Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N. Y. 125, 105 N. E. 92
(1914). See 25 A. L. R. 2d 29, at p. 170.
9 Argument and brief-Defendant's counsel.
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since the hospital itself is in the best position to control the num-
ber of accidents and to provide for accident prevention. A hos-
pital, of all places, ought to inaugurate and follow a safety pro-
gram for the benefit of employees and patients alike. Would it
not be wise to use the hospital machinery which already is in
existence, in order to control all of the many regular activities
which occur within the physical plant of the hospital? The hos-
pital has an administrative staff, hired and controlled by a Board
of Trustees. In conjunction, the hospital ordinarily has an Execu-
tive Council which usually consists of the trustees, the staff doc-
tors, and other executive-administrative personnel.
It is the function of this executive committee to determine
whether or not a particular doctor shall have the privilege to use
hospital facilities. Here, surely, is a "control."
Although the private physician himself theoretically controls
his patient while in the hospital, both the doctor and the patient
must observe the rules and regulations of the hospital.
For example, suppose that X is injured in an accident
and arrives at the Emergency Room. The intern or resident on
duty decides that this particular injury requires the services of
a specialist. Many times no opportunity is afforded to members
of the family, because of the emergency, to select the specialist.
Therefore, the hospital provides a specialist who has been ac-
corded privileges to practice in the particular institution. Under
the New York Rule, the specialist thus called to the hospital is
treated as an independent contractor.
The Ohio Supreme Court thus far has not decided that a
private physician using hospital facilities is an independent con-
tractor. Probably this is so because the application of the gen-
eral hospital immunity rule in Ohio, until the time of the Avel-
lone decision, made it unnecessary for the court to rule on his
status.
Within the last few months, in the case of Andrews v.
Youngstown Osteopathic Hospital Association, d.b.a. Cafaro
Memorial Hospital,10 the Seventh District Court of Appeals held
a hospital liable for the negligent injection of an anti-toxin shot
by an intern of that hospital. The purpose of the test was to
determine whether or not the patient was sensitive to the anti-
toxin. The plaintiff contended that the intern failed to allow a
sufficient amount of time to elapse before giving the shot. It
10 Andrews v. Youngstown Osteopathic Hospital Association, d.b.a. Cafaro
Memorial Hospital, 166 Ohio St. 228 (1957).
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developed, after some little time had elapsed, that the plaintiff
was sensitive to the anti-toxin. But the shot already had been
administered. This resulted in a condition known as serum sick-
ness, which incapacitated the plaintiff for several days. The
Supreme Court refused the Motion to Certify (in 166 Ohio State
228).
However, in view of the above-quoted excerpt from the
Avellone case, which cites the Schloendorff decision," it is fair
to assume that the Ohio Supreme Court would approve that
part of the Schloendorff opinion which holds that the private
physician occupies the status of an independent contractor rather
than that of an agent of the hospital.
We believe that the relation between a private physician and
a modem hospital makes the classification of the physician as an
independent contractor untenable. If the private physician must
be approved by the Executive Council in order to have hospital
privileges in a particular institution, then he must abide by the
recognized hospital rules and regulations governing his privilege
to practice in that hospital. Along with the rules and regulations,
the hospital Executive Committee imposes certain other restric-
tions and limitations upon the degree to which he may apply his
personal authority over employees of the hospital.
Modern developments in the role of the hospital in the
physician-patient relation increase the need for the private practi-
tioner to rely on equipment and technicians in the general em-
ploy of a hospital. Nowadays it appears that the private physi-
cian, when he practices medicine within the confines of the hos-
pital, almost never has the opportunity to exercise that degree
of independent control and supervision which has traditionally
characterized the status of a truly independent contractor.
Certainly, the development of the relation of the private
physician with the hospital has changed substantially in the last
fifty years. There is every indication that the private physician
will be quite completely integrated into, and controlled by, the
hospital in the near future.
Even when the private practitioner performs his most sig-
nificant service to his patient-that is when he is operating as a
surgeon-he is assisted by one or more physicians, in addition to
one or more nurses, most of whom are probably in the general
employ of the hospital. It seems to be basic logic that there is no
real distinction between the surgeon enjoying hospital privileges
11 Supra, n. 8.
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in treating his private patient, and the treatment rendered by
the resident doctor or the intern hired by the hospital. Many
times the same so-called "professional" act is performed by any
one of these three medical men.
The Journal of the American Medical Association recently
discussed some of the limitations of the New York Rule.12 In
substance it said that:
"the distinction between medical and administrative negli-
gence that prevailed in New York was an artificial one. If it
serves the public interest that a charitable hospital shall
enjoy immunity for the negligence of its employees, then
such interest is best served if the immunity is recognized
without artificial exception."
Then it went on to say:
"On the other hand, if social necessity recognizes that, as
between even a charitable hospital and an injured patient,
the hospital is better able to bear the risk, here, too, the
needs of an injured person to be compensated for negligent
injuries are exactly the same, regardless of any false legal-
isms that linger in the decisions of our courts."
In 1946 the New York Court of Appeals recognized some of
the limitations of its rule in the case of Nicolayff v. Genesee
Hospital.13 The plaintiff there had entered the defendant hos-
pital through arrangements made by her private physician. A
surgical operation was performed, and while she was recovering
from the operation an intern and a nurse entered her room and
told her that she was to have a blood transfusion from her
daughter. She protested, and advised both the nurse and the
intern that she had no daughter. Over her objections, they never-
theless administered the transfusion. As a result of administra-
tion of improper blood, she became seriously ill and temporarily
insane. Actually, the transfusion had been intended for another
patient. The New York Court held the hospital to be liable for
damages, and asserted that a charitable hospital could be held
liable for an injury to a patient resulting from the negligence of
an employee acting in an administrative capacity, even though
such employee be a physician, nurse, or other person normally
considered to be professional. The thinking of the Court, whether
it is considered as appalling or reasonable, was to the effect that
giving a transfusion to the wrong patient was negligence, and
that the entrance of the intern and nurse into the wrong room
12 163 J. Amer. Med. Assn. (4) (January 26, 1957).
Is Nicolayff v. Genesee Hospital, 270 App. Div. 648, 61 N. Y. S. 2d 832 (1946).
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caused the professional nature of their errand to cease. The hos-
pital was held liable for such negligence.
The Jornal of the American Medical Association stated, in
an article of January 26, 1957, commenting on the Nicolayff case,
that:
"giving a blood transfusion is clearly a medical act, and its
professional nature is not destroyed merely because, as in the
Nicolayff case, it was performed upon the wrong patient.
By calling it administrative because of the mistake, the
New York Court imposed liability upon a charitable hos-
pital."
The following was also stated in the same article: 14
"In New York, charitable hospitals are liable for the acts of
employees that are administrative and not professional in
nature. As a matter of common sense there does not seem
to be much logic in holding charitable hospitals free from
liability by labeling an act as 'professional' in one case and
imposing liability in a similar situation by the semantic
device of calling the act 'administrative.'"
With respect to blood transfusions, such as occurred in the
Nicolayff case, it goes without saying that accuracy in blood
grouping and cross-matching tests is fundamental to safe blood
transfusion. The physician, of necessity, must rely upon the
laboratory, because a physician usually has no way of knowing
whether incorrect grouping or cross-matching of blood has oc-
curred in the laboratory prior to the use of the blood for transfu-
sion. Utmost care must be taken, says the American Medical
Association, to provide precautionary measures in the laboratory
that will minimize the possibility of errors. Medical men, and not
lawyers, will reduce and control hospital accidents, states the
Journal, as follows: 15
"Those in charge of such laboratories should entrust grouping
and cross-matching tests only to reliable and specially trained
technicians. Many of the accidents that have occurred are di-
rectly attributable to untrained interns and physicians who
performed these tests at night or on holidays, in the absence
of regularly assigned technicians.
"Even when grouping and cross-matching tests are performed
by highly skilled persons, labels are sometimes switched or
bottles of blood mislabeled. A transfusion accident is prac-
tically inevitable once a bottle of blood has been mislabeled.
Accidents occurring because of mislabeling seem to be just
as prevalent as those resulting from errors in blood grouping
14 Supra, n. 12.
15 Supra, n. 12.
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or cross-matching. Besides errors in blood grouping, acci-
dents occur because of clerical errors of sheer carelessness,
as in the case in which one of two patients with similar or
identical names may require a transfusion and blood is ad-
ministered to the wrong person. If a patient suffers a pro-
longed illness or dies as a result of a transfusion of blood
of an incorrect group, the patient, or his family, if he does
not survive, may be entitled to damages unless the imme-
diate need for blood to sustain life allowed no time for
adequate tests. The transfusion of blood of an incompatible
group is prima facie evidence of negligence and legal
liability."
The Ohio Supreme Court has not stated in what degree it
will apply the doctrine of respondeat superior to the many facets
of hospital operation. The question for our Supreme Court ap-
parently is whether the Court will apply the New York Rule
to Ohio cases, or whether it will supplant the New York Rule
with a more workable rule of law, which will do away with the
troublesome fiction on which the New York Rule is based. The
case to which most authorities point as questioning the future
application of the New York Rule is Berg v. New York Society
for the Relief of the Ruptured and Crippled.16
There are several interesting medical and legal facets in this
case, and it deserves detailed discussion. The plaintiff, Mrs. Berg,
suffering from rheumatoid arthritis, entered the defendant's hos-
pital for a course of treatment that included the administration
of 500 cc. of blood. Prior to the performance of the transfusion,
a sample of her blood was sent to the hospital's laboratory for
analysis. The technician who tested it reported that Mrs. Berg's
blood was Type A, Rh positive. She was transfused with Rh
positive blood, but the transfusion was stopped when she started
to develop an unfavorable reaction. A few months after she was
discharged from the hospital she became pregnant, and was di-
rected by her family physician to a laboratory for the purpose of
determining her blood type and Rh factor. It was then dis-
covered, and later verified, that she was Type A, Rh negative,
and not Rh positive. During the course of Mrs. Berg's pregnancy
it was established that the fetus was an Rh positive one, since her
titer index rose substantially. She was advised that this increased
titer would in all probability be fatal to the fetus. Later the fetus
16 Berg v. New York Society for the Relief of the Ruptured and Crippled,
136 N. Y. S. 2d 528 (1954). For a general view of the conflicting doctrines
followed in various States see, Oleck, Non-Profit Corporations & Associa-
tions, Secs. 55-57 (1956).
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died, but Mrs. Berg was advised to carry through for the full
period. Because of the circumstances, the attending physician
at delivery found it necessary to use manual pressure upon the
abdomen for a much longer period than is usual or customary.
This caused various internal difficulties that required medical
treatment and ultimately a vaginal hysterectomy.
In the trial court, suit was brought against the attending
physician and the defendant hospital. The case against the physi-
cian was dismissed, and, after a trial without a jury, the court
awarded a judgment for the plaintiff against the hospital, on the
ground that the act of the laboratory technician was an adminis-
trative and not a medical act, and that the hospital was there-
fore responsible for the technician's negligence.
From this decision, the defendant hospital appealed to the
Appellate Division. There was a rather lengthy dissenting opin-
ion that viewed the negligent act as administrative. But the
majority of the court felt that in this individual case, without
making law to apply to other cases, it could have simply fol-
lowed the pattern of the trial court, the dissenting opinion of
the Appellate Division, and the many other New York cases
that hinged upon the distinction between administrative and
medical acts of negligence. Instead, the Court of Appeals chose
to make judicial law by acknowledging the act of negligence to
be medical, and nevertheless holding the hospital liable because
the negligent technician was "no independent practitioner of a
learned profession." Thus it appears that, although the Court
of Appeals did not by express language overrule its prior line of
decisions, charitable hospitals in New York are no longer im-
mune from liability for negligence of its employees of a routine
medical nature.
On January 10, 1957, in the case of Becker v. City of New
York,17 the New York Court of Appeals permitted recovery
against a hospital operated by the City of New York, where a
nurse administered an intravenous injection of a dye preceding
the taking of x-rays. The plaintiff was acutely ill from a kidney
ailment. He was twenty-nine years old, and had immigrated from
Poland two years previously. He had been in the same hospital
on two other occasions, and had received treatment for the same
ailment, including a cystoscopy, intravenous pyelograms and an
operation. The city hospital was operated on a nonprofit basis,
17 Becker v. City of New York, 1 A. D. 2d 1003, 153 N. Y. S. 2d 538; revd.
2 N. Y. 2d 226, 140 N. E. 2d 262 (1957); Noted, 12 The Record (Assn. of the
Bar of the City of N. Y.) 162 (Mar. 1957).
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although patients were charged for the care received. Interest-
ingly enough, however, the plaintiff had not yet paid for the
charges for any of his visits.
The plaintiff was placed in a ward with forty or fifty other
patients, with two nurses and four resident physicians in attend-
ance. On September 21st he was taken in a wheel chair to the
cystoscopy room. He was to be given an intravenous pyelogram,
known as an "IVP," an injection of a dye into the vein in order
to outline the kidney for x-ray purposes. A nurse employed by
the city for twenty years had been in charge of the cystoscopy
room for the past two years. She testified that her function in
that position was "to see that everything is run properly in that
room," to assist the doctor, and to take "care of all factors per-
taining to that room." She was authorized to administer skin
tests to determine allergy conditions, but she was not authorized
by the hospital to perform "IVP's." Apparently, it was accepted
practice for her to insert a hypodermic needle beneath the skin
and to release a small quantity of dye in conducting the allergy
test, but she was not similarly authorized to inject a large amount
of dye into the vein for the "IVP." This latter function was one
to be conducted by a physician, and the testimony disclosed that,
unless a nurse is specially trained, she is not qualified to per-
form an "IVP." The nurse in question had never been so trained.
On entering the cystoscopy room, plaintiff was removed from
the wheel chair and placed on a table. Despite his protests
against being injected in the right arm, by the nurse, without any
preliminary test, she inserted a hypodermic needle into the plain-
tiff's right arm below the elbow joint in the palmar surface.
With the needle in his arm, plaintiff started screaming, but the
nurse told him "you are a baby," and did not withdraw the
needle until she had finished the injection. When the needle was
withdrawn, plaintiff's arm was black and blue, with a feeling
"like I hold electricity." The hospital record discloses that some
days later that plaintiff "still complains of arm pain." There was
no preceding entry in the hospital records indicating prior pain.
Subsequently, the plaintiff was examined by a neurologist.
He found an injury to the median nerve, a nerve running down
the arm in the vicinity of the vein into which dye is injected for
the "IVP," and having to do with the control of the hand, re-
sulting in a nerve disorder known as causalgia.
The complaint of the plaintiff was dismissed by the trial court.
An appeal was taken to the Appellate Division of the Supreme
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol6/iss2/9
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Court, which affirmed the dismissal of the complaint by the trial
court. Subsequently, an appeal was prosecuted to the Court of
Appeals. This court held, according to the first branch of the
syllabus:
"The City of New York is liable, under the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior, for a negligent medical act performed
upon a patient in a nonprofit city hospital by a registered
nurse who was a paid employee of the city. Under Liubow-
sky v. State of New York (260 App. Div. 416, affd. 285
N. Y. 701) and Robinson v. State of New York (292 N. Y.
631), the effect of section 8 of the Court of Claims Act is
to make the State and its subdivisions liable for the negli-
gent acts of their paid employees, including nurses employed
by them in their hospitals."
In the second branch of the syllabus it stated:
"... The city may not escape liability solely because the em-
ployee was performing a medical act."
Admittedly, the Becker case is not squarely "on all fours"
with the thoughts expressed in this article, because the Schloen-
dorif rule (which is that a physician is an independent con-
tractor) is not applicable to the relation between the State and
its physicians, by reason of Section 8 of the New York Court of
Claims Act. The gist of that section, as stated in Jackson v. State
of New York, i8 is that the statute "waives immunity not only
from suit but also from liability," and constitutes a "recognition
of a moral duty demanded by the principles of equity and justice."
It transforms a questionable moral obligation into an ac-
tionable right, and applies to the State the rule of respondeat
superior.
The Becker case does, however, hold the city-owned hos-
pital to be liable for a "medical" or "professional" act. The New
York Court of Appeals refused to allow the nonprofit hospital of
the city to hide behind the Schloendorff rule. The Court of Ap-
peals did not hesitate to place liability on the hospital in this
situation because of the Court of Claims Act. However, because
of the court's prior decisions in the Nicolayff case and the Berg
case, it seems that the court will have to decide the "ultimate
fate of the Schloendorff rule." 19
As a result of the foregoing cases, it would appear that the
Ohio Supreme Court may be reluctant to adopt the New York
Rule, which distinguishes between "administrative" and "pro-
18 Jackson v. State of New York, 261 N. Y. 134, 138, 184 N. E. 735, 736 (1933).
19 Supra, n. 8.
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fessional" acts. It seems more probable that our court will profit
from the difficulties inherent in the New York Rule, and will
apply a rule of law stating that a hospital should be responsible
for all acts of negligence of its agents occurring within the physi-
cal confines of the hospital premises.
The writer is convinced that the above-cited New York
cases should stimulate much thinking in regard to the future
course of the law of physician-patient-hospital relations in Ohio.
The Journal of the American Medical Association has pub-
lished in recent months a series of articles dealing with medico-
legal problems. The Journal's Legal Department prepared these
articles. We believe it pertinent and fair to summarize some of
the conclusions of the Journal, dealing with the precise question
of the application of the New York Rule to hospital tort
liability.20 They are as follows:
"A number of medical, social, and legal conclusions can be
drawn from a study of the recent cases....
"From a medical standpoint, the taking and transfusion of
blood have evolved from difficult to relatively simple tech-
niques, while at the same time the number of accidents has
apparently increased appreciably. This is characteristic of
medical progress, for as the number of lifesaving procedures
increase the number of accidents likewise tend to increase
even though the ratio of accidents to treatment may remain
constant or even diminish.
"The compensation of injured persons at the expense of those
who are deemed responsible is determined fundamentally by
the social philosophy of the courts and justified by legal doc-
trines. Most lawyers will acknowledge the pliability of the
law applicable to personal injuries and the manner in which
the courts use legal doctrines to accommodate their con-
ceptions of social justice. More and more it is evident that
the courts are relying upon recognition of an underlying
principle of risk distribution, and this is reflected in the
frequency of verdicts for the plaintiff.
"No hospital, even if it is a charitable hospital that is oper-
ated in a jurisdiction that holds such institutions to be im-
mune from tort liability, can afford to be without insurance
coverage in the face of ever-broadening liability.
"When effective ways are discovered to eliminate the legal
problems that arise out of accidents in blood transfusions
and similar accidents, it will be physicians and not lawyers
who will lead the way by devising fool-proof techniques
that will avoid such errors as mistakes in blood-grouping or
20 Supra, n. 12.
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label-switching. In some of the grey areas the use of good
medicolegal forms will offer a measure of protection. How-
ever, in the final analysis these legal problems can be dealt
with adequately only if medicine will provide similar em-
phasis upon accident prevention and the utilization of already
acquired knowledge as it does to scientific advancement, for
true medical progress can only be measured by the preserva-
tion of life."
CONCLUSION
The charitable immunity doctrine has been modified in Ohio
by the Avellone decision. Now it appears that further steps must
be taken by the Ohio Supreme Court, so that every shred of the
so-called charitable institution rule as applied to hospitals will
be removed. The New York Rule has become bogged down with
exceptions, resulting in virtual impossibility of accurate applica-
tion of the rule. It is apparent that a change has taken place in
the structure of the physician-hospital relation which calls for
the creation of a different and more reasonable rule, predicated
upon the real facts of hospital operation. This is being brought
about by the necessity of the courts to admit that economic and
social changes, as well as the principle of risk distribution, de-
mand that the general public be protected against all negligence
committed within the physical plant of the hospital. The Ohio
Supreme Court has the opportunity to become the first State
court to adopt a truly sensible and workable rule of law to
govern hospital liability.21
21 In all jurisdictions where hospital immunity has been removed by court
decision, only one state has seen fit to inquire into the matter by legislative
action (Rhode Island) ard to enact a statute granting immunity to the
charity. The New York legislature, however, extended liability and made
the state and its political subdivisions responsible for their negligent acts
respecting hospitals as indicated by enactment of the Court of Claims Act.
Supra, n. 17.
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